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Faculty Scholarship

ADVISORY OPINIONS IN INDIA
William D. Popkinť

In a previous article*," Prematurity and Obiter Dictum in Indian

Judicial Thought'', we examined the dangers of premature judic

decision. Two main problems emerged ; the inadequate development

of the facts in the light of which a case must be decided, and t

intrusion by the judiciary into areas where private or political solu
tions might be more acceptable. The institution of " Advisory O

nions " presents these same problems and we now turn to a clo

examination of that institution in India.

I. INTRODUCTION

The standard criticism of an advisory opinion

in the Canadian case, Attorney-General for Ontario v. Ha

" They are questions proper to be considered in
only, and opinions expressed upon the operation
referred to, and the extent to which they are ap
be worthless for many reasons. They would be w
speculative opinions on hypothetical questions. It
trary to principle, inconvenient, and inexpedient
should be given upon such questions at all. When

must arise in concrete cases, involving privat

would bę extremely unwise for any judicial tribu
beforehand to exhaust all possible cases and fac
occur to qualify, cut down, and override the ope
cular words when the concrete case is not before

As long as advisory opinions develop by analo
given by a lawyer to a client this criticism is lik
force. For it is normally the function of the law

in advance of concrete factual developments. The la
exhaust all possible situations in anticipation of some

deal in a hypothetical way with some abstract pr

which it is feared may become applicable to his clien

t LL.B. (Harvard) Fulbright Scholar, Indian Law Institute, N
* Vol. IV* No. 2 (April-June 1962) of this journal.

I. [1903] A.C. 524, 529.
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402 ADVISORY OPINIONS IN INDIA

However, the development by analogy to a lawyer's ad
an intrinsic trait of this institution.2 The hypothetical n
problem presented to the court is not inevitable. A hy

premature question can be presented to the Court for
opinion in two ways. First, there may actually be a m

concrete controversy prompting the reference but the q
will be stated in the hypothetical manner usually characte
mature controversies3. Secondly, the fact situation may no
with the result that the counsel inadequately understa
and the judges are unable to write concrete statements of
Writers often speak as though the abstraction of the
is essential in an advisory opinion 4 or make it the founda

criticism.5 But there is no reason to suppose that the

must abstract a legal question from a concrete situation o
reference will deal with premature fact situations. Indeed

tution may develop so as to approximate closely a syst
ratory judgments dealing with concrete cases, rather
practice of legal advice to a client.6

India has had a specific provision for advisory opin
1937.7 Under the Government of India Act, 1935, fou

were given : In re C. P. Motor Spirit Act ; In re Hindu Wom

Property Act ; In the Matter of the Allocation of Lands and Bui

Levy of Estate Duty.8 And under the 1950 Constitution, th

2. Article 76 (2 ) of the Constitution of India already makes it lh

Attorney-General to give legal advice to the government.
3. The practice of the International Court of Justice with advisor

sometimes been to insist on such abstraction : Judgment of the Administr

the International Labour Organization [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 77, 158-59 ; Interpr
Treaties with Bulgaria , Hungary & Rumania [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 84 ; Co

General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the U.N. [1950] I

Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the U.N. [1948] I.C.J.

4. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed. 1941) p. 73 ; see also Jud
Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization [1956
158-59.

5. Frankfurter, "A Note on Advisory Opinions", 37 Hary.L . Rev.
6. Allen, 'Administrative Consultation of the Judiciary", 47 L.

(1931) (if concrete facts involved, situation is not like the usual adv

Hart & Wechsler, Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953) p. 81 (adv

the old World Court are more like declaratory judgments since actu
adverse parties are involved).
7. Government of India Act, 1935, sec. 213 (becoming effective in
8. A.I.R. 1939 F.C. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Pr
A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 72 (hereinafter referred to as the Hindu Women's ca
F.C. 13 (hereinafter referred to as the Allocation case) ; A.I.R. 194
inafter referred to as the Levy case).
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have been rendered : In re Ďelhi Laws Act ; In re

In re Indo- Pakistan Agreement relating to Ber
of Enclaves. 9 It is the purpose of this articl
experience with this institution to see the ext
of prematurity have been avoided and to see w

may be attendant upon such a practice. Wh
of this critique will be to point out certain r

of reaching a negative conclusion. The pur

possible dangers and compensating advantage
stimulated among those better able to reach
II. HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS

There-is no doubt that the Federal Court and the Supreme
have always attempted to assimilate the court procedures in an
opinion to those of the usual adversary proceeding. This redu

danger of hypothetically phrased questions remaining in

abstract state, provided that the situation prompting the refe
the Court is a concrete dispute. The 1950 Constitution, as we
1935 Act, required opinions to be given in open court, 10 wh
courages the care and deliberation that comes when public sc
follows. The Supreme Court rules provide that the procedure

priate to the Court's original jurisdiction shall be followe

possible in a reference under Article 143. 11 Under the Gove
of India Act cases, the Court always saw to it that interested

were represented.12 There can be no doubt that the proc

the Court will make a reference as close to a normal adversar
is possible.13

The intention to assimilate the advisory jurisdiction to th
of the normal adversary jurisdiction is also reflected in the w
9. A.I.R. 1951 S.G. 332 (hereinafter referred to as the Delhi Laws Act case);
A.I.R. 1958 S.G. 956 (hereinafter referred to as the Kerala case) ; A.I.R. 1960 S.G. 845
(hereinafter referred to as the Berubari case).

10. Government of India Act, 1935, sec. 213 (2) ; Article 145(4) of the Constitution of India.

11. Supreme Court Rules, 1950, Part V, Rules 1-5.
12. Hindu Women's case, p. 73 (notify Advocates-General of Provinces though no
notice to any other parties) ; Central Provinces case, p. 3 (notify other provinces in view

of their contingent interest) ; Levy case, p. 74 (Government of India and Provinces
notified and amicus brief for taxpayers required) ; In the Allocation case, the center
and Punjab appeared as the most directly interested parties.
13. However, it should be noted that the International Court of Justice has
retreated from its earlier strict requirements of adversary proceedings in an advisory
opinion; see Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania 1950
I.C.J. Rep. 65, where the Court gave an opinion despite the unwillingness of a party
to appear.
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treatment of advisory opinions as binding precedent w
decisis effect, 14 and the invariable compliance with th

political bodies 15. It is often said that advisory op
legally binding.16. However, as long as the procedu

cteristic of the normal case, a primary reason for with
decisis effect is removed ; for if the parties vitally int
outcome of the litigation participate adversely, subsequ
lose one basis for objecting to the application of the law
in that case to themselves. Further evidence that such
meant to be as authoritative as normal judgments is in
in the Constitution for five judges to sit out of the eig
required by the Constitution to be on the Court.17
While the use of adversary procedures and the givin
in open Court can go a long way in concretizing abst
questions, no procedures can concretise a genuinely p

There the danger of abstractness lies in the lack of

not in the phraseology of the question or the lack of a

cedures. The safety valve for such situations remain

advisory opinions are not binding as well as the rule th

has discretion to refuse to give an opinion in most

14. K . K. Chatter jee v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 30 o

(dismissed because the issues were covered by the Berubari opinion) ;

A.I.R. 1956 Patna 188, 190 ( Delhi Laws Act case followed) ; Kadhi
Sahu A.I.R. 1951 Orissa 378, 396 (Hindu Women' s case the highest
subject) ; Emperor v. Munnal Lai A.I.R. 1942 All. 156, 168 (duty
Provinces case).

15. After the Levy case no estate duty was enacted. The British
it necessary to amend the Government of India Act, 1935 (see Stat

p. 54) and the 1950 Indian Constitution also included a special p

estate duty (List I, No. 87 of Schedule 7).
Following the Kerala decision, the state amended the bill to confor
opinion; Moothedam, The Kerala Education Act, 1958, and Minorit
Ker. L.T. 55.

16. See e.g. Kerala case, p. 964.
17. Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India. It was even the intention of t

framers that a full bench sit ; Report of the Committees to the Constituent Assembly (F

Series) 1947, Dec., 1946 - July, 1947, p. 64, dated July 4, 1947. Seven judges sat
the Delhi Laws Act and Kerala cases, eight in the Berubari reference.

18. Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India says that the Court "ma

report its opinion. It is only in the special case of certain treaties under Article 143

that the Court ''shall" report to the President. The Constitutional Convention w
clear that e'may" was intended to be permissive, "shall" compulsory ; Constitue

Assembly Debates , Vol. VIII, May 16- June 16, 1949, p. 387. The Kerala ca
supports this view, p. 964-
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Advisory opinions will have the stare decisi

entitled in the light of their compliance
embodied in the doctrine of prematurity.19
The Federal Court on one occasion denied the stare decisis effect

of an advisory opinion and completely reviewed the rationale of its
prior opinion.20 It is interesting that the legal issue reviewed suffered from serious defects of prematurity in the case in which it origi-

nally arose, the Hindu Women's case. In that advisory opinion the
Court even conceded that there was as yet no " opposite party " to
the legal contentions raised by the government in the reference. The
Court did see to it that the provinces were represented. This assured
a vigorous argument against the encroachment of the center upon
the provincial sphere of agricultural property. But the provinces did
not care at all about the total invalidity of the statute.21 No dispute
on this point had yet developed. Nonetheless, the question of total
invalidity was raised. The bill had been considered by one house
of the Parliament before the implementation of the Government of
India Act and by another house after that Act became effective. The
Court found that this did not disqualify it from becoming law. In
the Umayal Achi case, supra , however, the litigants were genuinely
concerced with this issue of total invalidity and the opinions of the
judges reflect the difference. Each judicial statement is far more
carefully worked out and each argument more fully weighed.

Using this test of a mature controversy as the basis for the
binding effect of an advisory opinion, we find one other opinion
seriously defective, the levy case. Here the issue was the central
government's right to legislate an estate tax as opposed to an inheritance tax. No bill had been drafted in the legislature. The bill
which the Court considered was the one which the parties agreed on,
not one which the legislature had passed or even considered. 22 It is
difficult to find a more hypothetical question ; the Court was being
used simply as a government lawyer. No adversary atmosphere could
19. Res adjudicata effect is also denied. This rule, if it were applicable, would
bar only those who participated in the case and their privies from raising the issues in

another litigation. However, since the parties did not choose the issues and did not
initiate the suit, this rule should not apply as long as the absence of stare decisis effect
allows the rest of the world to challenge the opinion.

20. Uttioyal Achí v. Lakshmi Achí A.i.ix. iy±o r.Ct. zo.
21. Hindu Women's case, 1941 F.G R. Vol. 111. p. 19 (argument of counsel).
22. Levy case, p. 77 ; the Governor-ueneral expressly ínviteü an opinion on the
assumption that the bill was the same as the English statute.
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be generated since the parties before the Court were not d
involved as adversaries in an imminent controversy. The pr

this lies in the concession by the taxpayer's representative, wh
been appointed by the government, of the right of the govern
to tax.23 No taxpayer could feel that his interests were adeq
represented when such a concession is made.

The Court said that this case was not hypothetical sinc

Governor-General was seriously considering giving the central g
ment the power to impose estate duties if the Court found tha
legislature lacked such power at present. This completely misu

stands the function of the doctrine of prematurity. Alegai
not made less hypothetical because there is intense concern abo

Where that concern springs from the imminence of an act
does not make the legal issues any more concrete, the probl
mains hypothetical. Here the supposed imminence was with
to the Governor-General's granting a power to the central g

ment, not with regard to the passage oí the bill and the levyin
tax, which alone might have made a question about the law con
By contrast with the lack of adversary proceedings in the H
Women's and Levy cases, we may compare the Allocation refer
There the government's problem was much like that of a privat
owner whose title is challenged at a time when he hopes to

land. This case closely parallels a declaratory judgment to r

a cloud on title to realty. It is very strange, therefore, that the
picked this case in which to voice its misgivings about the noneffect of an advisory opinion.24 This was the strongest case fro
point of view.
The inadequate fact development in the Hindu Women's and

cases resulted in an inability to have fully developed adve
proceedings. This is the most extreme defect of a prematu
situation. More frequently, prematurity results in the inad
understanding of the immediate impact of a challenged p
legislation, though an adversary presentation is possible. I

Kerala case, the Court heard the reference before the rules had
promulgated under the statute. The threatened impact of a tak

of schools in that state was enough to ensure a very adver

proceeding. Nonetheless, an understanding of the full impact o
23. Levy case, p. 76.
24. Allocation case, p. 15; seer Vol. 1, p. 15. "Executive Consultation of the

Judiciary with Special Reference to India" Trivandrum Law College Journal ,
March, 1955, Vol. 1, p. 15.
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a take-over in all its details was lost to the Co

have the rules before it.25 The lack of any

under the Kerala Education Bill meant a similar def ect in understand-

ing the immediate context in which the legal issue arose. Both rules
and administrative practice may better reveal how a statute immediately effects individuals.

In the Central Provinces case we see a different type of factual

deficiency from that so far discussed. The facts in that case were
sufficiently developed to assure an adversary presentation by the
parties ; the bill was ready to be brought into effect but for the
Court's decision.26 And the immediate impact of the central govern-

ment's removal of the state's power to tax sales to consumers was
reasonably clear without administrative practice ; for, unlike the
take-over of schools in the Kerala case, the immediate impact of a loss
of revenue can be easily translated into meaningful quantitative terms.
However, it is possible that greater long-term historical experience
with the relationship between state and center concerning sales taxes

and other revenue matters would have been of great assistance in
determining the constitutional and legal resolution of this dispute.
Practice can be an excellent guide to the proper solution of consti-

tutional questions,27 and the Court forfeited this by deciding the
reference at an early stage of constitutional development.

The Delhi Laws Act case presented a similar problem. An adversary proceeding and an understanding of the immediate impact of the

challenged legislation was assured ; the very issue before the Court
had been presented two years earlier to the Federal Court in a
25. State of Bombay v. United Motors Ltd. A.I.R. 1953 S.G. 252, 262 (rules used to

interpret statute; the fact that rules passed simultaneously with the statute is

irrelevant, Bose, J. at p. 268-69).

cf. Levy case, p. 77 where it was admitted that the machinery sections of a statute
may be useful in understanding the charging sections.

26. Hindustan Times, April 28, 1938, p. 14, col. 6.

27. In McCulloch v. Maryland 4 L.Ed. 579, 602 (1819), Marshall, J. stated this
view in the expression, it is a ''constitution we are expounding.'' In that very case#
Daniel Webster, as counsel, had stressed the long-standing acceptance by both the
legislature and the executive as evidence of its constitutionality (p. 581).
In the Central Provinces case, however, the Court expressed doubt concerning the

value of actual practice ; p. 37. Especially was this thought to be true when the
document being interpreted was a new one, differing radically from prior basic law.
However, the very youth of the document urges awaiting further experience before
ąttempting to interpret it.
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concrete case.28 But, like the Central Provinces case, it cam
beginning of the experience under the document to be in

The doctrine of " delegation of legislative power ", at
case, is one that the experience of history can greatly
vacillation of U.S. courts on this question, and the workin

legal solution by careful case by case development, suggest
tance of such experience.29

Furthermore, the lack of administrative practice over a
time in the Kerala case not only deprived the Court of an
ing of the immediate impact of the legislation ; it also me

broader social background in the light of which the co

issues had to be determined was unknown.

The assumption behind the view suggested here is directly
contrary to the approach which maintains that words of a statute or a

constitution "mean what they say." Gold, hard facts, discovered
through practice, may shed light upon the legal solution which judges

and lawyers could never have anticipated.30 A deficiency of such
historical facts may thwart a proper resolution of the legal problems

arising out of an otherwise concrete and mature case. The idea
expressed is that the immediate impact of a statute may be known,
but the long term legal significance and interpretation of the statute or

relevant Article of the Constitution remain uncertain. The termino-

logy often used by U.S. legal writers to denote the distinction between

facts required to illumine the immediate impact of a legal rule and
those required to help interpret a legal rule is adjudicative facts for
the former and legislative or historical facts for the latter.31

Nor should the phrase "legislative facts " make courts wary of
intrusion upon legislative functions. Judicial awareness of basic social
trends is crucial and is not a usurpation of the political functioning of
the legislature.
Whenever either type of factual development is inadequate, an
advisory opinion should be considered less trustworthy and its stare
28. Jatindra Nath v. Province of Bihar A.I.R. 1949 F.G. 175; the Delhi Laws Act
case admittedly (p. 338) involved a re-examination of this case.

29. See the remarks of Bose, J. in Delhi Laws Act case, p. 437 (even American
judges departed from their old rigid view of delegation under the pressure of the
circumstances) ; p. 439 (this question must be left to case by case development).
30. Frankfurter, " A note on Advisory Opinions 37 Harv. L. Rev . 1002, 1005-06
(1924).
31 . See 44 Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes", 69 Harv. L. Reo,

1302, 1311 (1956).
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decisis effect limited ; although the lack of adjud
serious because it prevents an understanding of wh
historical facts are available at the stage of histor
arises.

Furthermore, the inadequacy of legislative facts
as a factor in refusing to give an advisory opinion
could not be independently significant in deciding

of prematurity. For a case will not be prematu

impact of the relevant legal rule is apparent, how
historical experience with that legal rule may b
that the lack of historical experience can carry in
litigation is to re-enforce a decision that other elem

warrant a denial of a judicial pronouncement. However, in an
advisory reference the discretion to refuse an opinion, as well as the
power to grant a hearing,32 is broader than in the normal adversary
litigation. Any lack of historical experience may, therefore, legitimately be considered as an independent factor in deciding whether or
not to render an opinion.
It may be said that the possibility of challenging a bill immediately
after it becomes a statute makes our suggestion of the importance of
legislative facts untenable. Apart from over-looking the benefit of
the rules which come after passage, this argument begs the question.
Why may it be challenged after passage ? Has anyone been hurt ? Has
its application been threatened ? All the questions of prematurity, i.e.,

the development of adjudicative facts, which we belaboured in the
prior article recur.

The Delhi Laws Act case revealed another danger which is normally
associated with prematurity, but which did not spring from such a
defect in this case. Just as abstractness may result from the manner
in which a legal question is phrased despite the maturity of the facts,33
so the atmosphere in a reference may prove conducive to the abstract

treatment of the question referred. This may be so although the
concrete facts are present, the procedures are the same as in a normal

case, and the legal question is concretely put to the Court. In the
Delhi Laws Act case, the question presented to the Court was treated as
32. The phrase "likely to arise" in Article 143(1) allows pending legislation to
be examined in an advisory opinion [Kerala case, p. 964 ; Levy case, p. (75), although
this is not allowed in normal litigation ; Bhairabendra v. State of Assam A.I.R. 1953

Assam 162.

33. See fn. 3 and accompanying text.
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opening up the entire issue of legislative delegation

However, the concrete question before the Court was th
of delegation of legislating power in small areas where i
legislative machinery was impractical and expensive, rat
usual one of a rule-making power to implement social w

tion. Only one justice noted the narrower implica

question.35 The rest filled over one hundred pages wi
abstraction which proved confusing in subsequent cases.
that this tendency to dilate was due to an atmosphere g
reference proceeding, much as lawyers may sit aro
exhausting all the ramifications of a legal issue before v

advise a client.37

This tendency to abstraction in an advisory opinion even when
the reference is based on a concrete situation, can be seen in the
practice of the International Court of Justice. There the abstraction
does not occur at the stage of oral argument by counsel, as it did in
the Delhi Laws Act case, but at the earlier stage of the framing of the

question put to the Court. The issues must be abstracted from the
underlying concrete fact situation,38 although this view is not without
its dissenters.39 The feeling is that an opinion on a question of law is
different from a settlement of a dispute. The former is abstract, the

latter concrete. Such a view is directly contrary to what we would
assert to be a question of law, i.e., the application of general rules to
concrete fact situations, arising in an actual dispute. However, this
34. This development is not a necessary one ; see Central Provinces case, p. 3
("question lies in a small compass") ; and Kerala case, p. 992 (because this is an
advisory opinion, the reference should be narrowly construed;.
The concern with the tendency to write rambling essays is behind the recommen-

dation in 69 Haw . L. Rev. 1302, 1312 that the maitrix case should always be made
apparent.

35. Delhi Laws Act case, Bose, J., pp. 434-35.
36. Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 123, 126 (difficult
to find a definite principle of use in other cases from the Delhi Laws Act opinions) ;
Ziaullah Khan v. State ofUttar Pradesh A.I.R. 1955 All. 554, 557 (the language of the
Delhi Laws Act case allows delegation of repeal powers even though that case held
otherwise).
37. The taxpayer's concession in the Levy case (see fn. 23) may have sprung from
the "friendly" atmosphere of a reference proceeding.
38. See fn. 3.

39. Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide [1951]

I.C.J. Rep. 15, 31 (though the question is abstract it will be more realistic to state the
facts) ; Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the U.N. [1950]

I.G.J. Rep. 4, 22; Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the U.N. [1948J

I.C.J. Rep. 57, 107.
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dichotomy has been maintained by the Interna
is a danger that the tendency towards abstracti
in advisory opinions.40

There is a further risk in advisory opinion
with a premature case, but which here arise

which a reference originates and not from the e
fact situation. A premature case may raise as t
is really a tangential issue frprn the point of vi
Attention will be incorrectly focussed because t

the legal issues are not understood. In an a

" wrong issue " may be raised for another reaso

be interested in something which does not seriousl

tive litigants. This can happen because there is
the government be the party most interested
raised by the reference proceeding which it in

danger is not great. Any issue not discusse
precluded in a later case even if the advisory
full stare decisis effect. This is due to the inap

of res adjudicata. However, the psychological ef
In the Kerala case, the most prospective petitio
government, but the institutions of learning w
the state.42 These parties felt that the main c
were not the points raised by the government.4
The Court refused to consider the objections
since it was held that the President's interest in
limited the scope of inquiry. But in upholding

40. See fn. 13 on the International Court's retreat fro
to adversary procedures in advisory opinions.
41. It has been suggested, therefore, that an advisory o
the government asking the question is concerned with th

"Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statu
1307-08 (1956).
42. It is true that the central government was required to take " action in the
form of Presidential approval of this bill which had been reserved by the Governor for

his assent (Article 200 of the Constitution). But the requirement that the referring
government's own action be involved in the reference is designed to make it a natural
litigant in the proceeding. This is possible only if it is directly a^ected by the chailenged bill or if it is the source of the legislation, neither of which is true as a result of
Presidential assent.

43. Kerala case, p. 965 ; Article 19(1 )(g) (freedom to practice any profession or
to carry on any occupation, trade or business) was urged on the Court, and it seems

that Article 30(2) (no discrimination in monetary aid to educational institutions
against religious minority) was also of great impor tenance.
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solidified public opinion around the belief that certain pa

valid as against all constitutional objections. Thus the

effect as well as the time and expense of further litigati
any future testing of this statute.
III. Judicial Intrusion in Political Affairs

The dangers we have so far discussed have all in
problems of abstractness. There is, however, a secon

broadly characterized as the intrusion of the courts int
political affairs. We have already seen one aspect of thi
situations where historical or legislative facts could have
formulating legal rules. This was just another way of s
process of experience might offer solutions which were

accelerated judicial deliberation of a court. However, the more

specific meaning of the injunction against judicial intrusion envisions
the utility of specific institutional settlements of nascent disputes such
as a contractual or political bargain, rather than the general advantages of historical experience.
With advisory opinions in India, this danger is most likely to take

the form of totally by-passing the political arena. The phrase
" likely to arise ", which characterizes one type of question on which

an opinion may be given, has been interpreted to allow pending
legislation to come before the Court in a reference proceeding;
although a pending bill cannot be challenged in a normal adversary
proceeding. When pending legislation is examined judicially we lose
the benefit of a political judgment on the social needs which prompted
the legislation, i.e., on the legislative or historical facts which must

contribute to the judicial solution of the problem.44 Nor can such
political judgment be ignored, in its larger sense of an expression of
the basic desires of the people, without running the risk of unnaturally
isolating legal decisions from the deeper social and political trends of

the society.45 The law does not lie on one side of a rigid line on

the other side of which resides the political and private sector.

When a political judgment is by-passed we also run the risk of
embracing difficult and controversial questions, although it may
44. Frankfurter, " A Note on Advisory Opinions 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1005
(1924).

45. The weight of this assertion is not as great in India as in the United States.
The procedure for amendment of the Indian Constitution is simple (Art. 368) Compared to^thejstricttr requirements of the U.S. Constitution. It can be argued that the
basic desires of the people in India have a relatively easy outlet if constitutional
change is desired so that courts need not be too solicitous of this factor,
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never be necessary to do so if the legislature fa

The presentation of a draft bill does not really cur
best it is some evidence of the seriousness of the p
realize its legislative aims.
One of the reasons given by the Calcutta High C

Bose v. Union of India 46 for refusing to decide the cas

to be based upon an awareness of the dangers of
political process is incomplete. Here the incomp

legislative, for a bill was not challenged ; it was rat
of executive action. The Court refused judicial relie
the executive department was acting unconstitutio
definite decision to take action without consulting
been taken and no orders to the State of West Ben

any decision had been issued. The court noted th

of the arguments made to the Bench,47 which may
the lack of any final political judgment having bee
on the subject.48 And yet this very volatile issúe w
Supreme Court in the Beruh ari case for an advisor
the same elements of prematurity persisted.

A danger closely related to that of by-passing p
is the lessening of legislative or executive responsib
titutionality of its own decisions because it may fee

judiciary where such doubts arise.49 We are assu

strength of a constitution must lie in the responsib
and their elected representatives, however useful ju
be. In India, however, there is every evidence that
executive still consider themselves separately respon
titutionality of their own decisions ; for the Attor
right to address the Parliament and his advice has b
46. A.I.R. 1959 Gal. 506.

47. Id. at p. 519.
48. In the Central Provinces case, only a bill was presented for an advi
opinion ; but it appears that the the process of political judgment had stoppe
bill awaited only a notification which was itself dependent only upon the Co
decision ; Hindustan Times, April 28, 1938, p. 14, col. 6. However, one can nev
too sure what political factors may arise despite the conviction that only a Co
decision is relevant.

49. Frankfurter, "A note on Advisory Opinions", 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1007
(1924).

50. Under Article 88 of the Constitution of India, the Attorney-General has the
right to address Parliąment. The government accepted his advice that a law passed
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One reason why this danger is not pressing lies in the
limited use of advisory opinions. The attitude among most pe
wards advisory opinions is one of approval if they are not us
often. This certainly was the intention of the framers of th
titution,51 although it is never said why it is good in moder
not if used frequently. It may well be that the fear of co
elected officials into petitioners in Court is a primary reason
couraging a limited use of the reference proceeding.

The primary risk of advisory opinions in India, however,
from judicial involvement in political controversy. We have a
seen that whenever the activity of a government is examined b
action has been finalized, the ebb and flow of political contro
likely to continue to distrub the judicial calm.52 However, th
special danger of such a disturbance in the Indian practice ev

governmental action is completed. For the requirement in

143 that the question referred be one of " public import " me
the controversy prompting the reference will be contempora
likely to involve much political heat. Of course, the issue
visory opinion may not generate much heated controversy eve
one of " public import ", just as a normal case may frequentl
cause of a great political storm. However, the peculiar positio
instigating party as the head of the state, taking instructions
political head of the government, makes the practice of gi
political issues to the Court an easy one to develop, and there
ence that such a trend is developing in the recent Kerala and
references.53

By "political issues" it is not meant to imply that the questions

Court are political or policy questions. It only means that the
here in which the litigation arises is one of heated political con

by the center banning cow-slaughter would be unconstitutional ; Pari. Debat

Part II, Vol. V., pp. 7997, 8005 and Vol. III-IV, pp. 6235-40.
The advice of the Law Minister was to be offered for the express pur

affecting votes ; Pari . Debates, 1954, Part II, Vol. I-II, p. 2018.
51. Report of the Committees to the Constituent Assembly (First Series) 1
1946-July, 1947, p. 64, dated July 4, 1947.
52. Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and International Courts, 3
Ł. Rev. 970; 975 (1924) ; Schwartz, American Constitutional Law (1955) pp.
decide the validity of governmental action before it is taken is to act in
manner ").
53. The Court in the Kerala case noted its dislike of the extreme heat in
arguments, p. 973.
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Although political heat may be in the bac
gation, this fact does not dismiss the dange
visory opinions. The Court's reserve of pres
Courts must settle genuine private disput
atmosphere. This is their job. But this d
good idea to encourage dipping into polit
volvement in legal disputes with a politic
dissatisfy one of the parties, the one that l

sions involved, the more likely it is that the

on the Court. The inevitability of this in

argument for providing another forum wher
rence proceeding. It may be that the limite
is preferred for this reason as well.

This sense of the danger of involvement
even when a legal and not a political or poli
clearly reflected in the advisory opinion pr
Court of Justice. It was earlier noted.that th
tract questions when " legal questions " arose
The context in which the Court made those
that the judges did not actually consider leg
questions, but rather that only by abstract
the political controversy which prompted th
ing of the word " political " is the sense in
here.

It is riot suggested that the Indian Supre

abstractions. Such decisions are, as has be
guides to actions and inadequate
the Court cannot really hope to
by dealing in abstractions,56 any
avoid his enemies by placing his

solutions o
avoid the h
more than
head in th

politically too volatile, that should honestly

in deciding whether or not to take the referen

This difficulty of intrusion into political
more serious than the problems relating to
54. See fn. 3 and accompanying text.

55. Admissibility of Hearing of Petitioners by the C

I.G.J. Rep. 23, 36-37 (Lauterpacht, J.) .
56. See cases m in. oy.

57. Like the lack of legislative facts, volatility may not be an independent reason

for refusing an otherwise mature case in a normal adversary proceeding. But the
broader discretion in a reference proceeding allows an open consideration of this
factor.

This content downloaded from 129.79.132.155 on Fri, 28 Jul 2017 18:07:12 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

416 ADVISORY OPINIONS IN INDIA

the latter defect can be cured by a judicious use of sta
the former harm is irreparable.

The most recent advisory opinion, the Berubari case,

example of the Court's involvement in a political c

issue was a purely legal one, "How does the governmen
ly cede territory if the situation was, in fact, one of

ever, this issue was one which had exacerbated pub
long time before.58 The real danger in this case b

only if we assume that the opinion had favoured the
ment's position and allowed a mere executive order to
instead of a constitutional majority in the legislature
in West Bengal ran very high, and could only have

the Court.59 It cannot be said that this is raising

Each case can go either way if we assume that the Co
impartial judgment on a doubtful legal question.

The alternative to West Bengal's displeasure is the
of the center at an adverse decision. Once again, the p

of this dissatisfaction is not apparent. Here the ce

case but it easily controlled the constitutional majority
However, the Court cannot proceed on the assumptio
tional decisions will be a rubber-stamp process for the
more significantly, that the political power to accompl
in the years to come. Time will make the majority in t
fragile thing and an averse opinion by the Court on a
question a far more serious matter.60

The danger discussed above involves the loss of pre

account of involvement in a political controversy.
from the reaction to the Court's opinion. But the
serious danger, which is that the public will consid
advisory opinion to be a political weapon rather t

58. Times of India, January 23, 1959, p. 6, col. 7 and April 7,
The Calcutta High Court, hearing the issue which the Supreme C
the Berubari case in A.I R. 1959 Cal. 506, noted the political conten
at p. 519.
59. See fn. 58 ; even after the opinion required two-thirds of the Parliament to
approve the executive decision, West Bengal was furious with the center ; Times of
India, November 26, 1960, p. 1, col. 8 and December 14, 1960, p. 1, col. 2 ; the Court
would have received this invective if it had found against West Bengal.
60. It may be that the pressures for a disregard by the political powers of the
Court's opinion will emerge as a significant danger with this decline of the majority in
the center, however unlikely this is at present (see fn. 15).
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resolving legal doubts. In Berubari it appears tha
vated by genuine legal uncertainty ; in fact, W
the reference.61 But in the Kerala case, the situ
different. There it looked as though the govern
advisory opinion to support a position which it

to control. It is not asserted that the govern
impure. This we cannot know. But the appe
they can be equally important when the pres

concern.

In the Kerala case, the political atmosphere was ev
as in Berubari ,62 But in addition, the purpose in ra
did not seem to be a genuine concern for the legali
as it had been in Berubari. The legal doubts, howev
have been, seemed injected into the controversy as

ing on the political struggle. The Kerala State go

legislation was challenged, was of a different party

and they opposed the reference.63 They accused
crimination in not referring other similar measures

using the advisory opinion for political ends. It

having lost the political battle in the state concern
an education bill, the ruling party in the center tri
Supreme Court.
It may be objected that the President is expecte
constitutionality of state measures when the Gove
for his assent. But such a practice of reservation s

in such a way as to give the appearance of discr

especially so when the constitutional issue is purely
the state and its own residents, rather than one in
affecting an all-India interest such as inter-state c

portant of all, the Court should not make itself
practice even if the President insists on coming

these legal questions himself.
It is no answer to say that the Court cannot be
purposes since its opinion cannot be known in adva

essentially political, however real the legal weapon
be, the party with one weapon in its arsenal denie

be suspected of using it to its own advantage. T

61. Times of India, April 7, 1959, p. 6, col. 7.
62. Times of India, January 1, 1958, p. 1, col. 4 and Ma

col. 4.

63. Times of India, March 18, 1 958, p. 9, col. 4 ; Brief for State of Kerala,

pp. 18-19.
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could not get an opinion in the Supreme Court. It had
pect that the center, in the face of political defeat, tr
battle in the courts. The suggestion is not the perpetua
stitutional statutes. Private litigants may challenge the s

point. But it is necessary to emphasize unwisdom of
Court in a constitutional question which arises beca
tactics not entirely free from suspicion.

It is not certain what effect this practice will have up

All the anger at unfair treatment could be vented up
government. However, this practice is a ready breeding

cynicism as to the Court's impartiality and general aloof
political arena, not in the sense of the broad social and p
the people, but in the narrower meaning of particular po

The specific charge of partiality to the executive is at prese

However, the general charge of involvement with the

tical factions has force. There may be no danger ye

prestige is secure. But that prestige itself rests on a be

stand beyond party politics. The danger is that th

upon which the Court relies in giving these advisory op
eroded away by the very process of their issuance.

The position of the Communist state government

case may be a good sample of future developments; for
cations of the misuse of advisory opinions will become
when the monolithic structure of the Congress party be
As states fall to the control of other parties, the publi
more aware of the possibility that the center is not dea
political opponents when a reference is made on issues

cal concern.

It may be urged that the attempt to avoid these political battles
is illusory since the government is only going to refer questions of
great contemporary interest which would, in any event, be raised at
the first possible occasion by private litigants. First of all, this argument has no weight against a charge of unfairness by the center in
making the reference. Secondly, one can never be too sure in a prediction of imminent litigation. It is true that the Kerala and Berubari
64. The original danger of advisory opinions was felt to be the subservience
which the judges would develop towards the executive based on a lack of tenure and a
desire to satisfy the questioner with the answer he would most like ; Maitland, Consti -

tutional History of England (1948) p. 479. The lack of life tenure in India provides
some basis for the development of such a suspicion among the public, though no such
attitude is developing at present.
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cases sprang from heated circumstances like
legal battles. But who can be so sure of fore
what Indo-Pakistan relations might have led

or who' knew for certain what a legislativ

cession in advance of the Supreme Court he
in the Kerala case, might not the passage of
Bill have led to Emergency rule in the State
dent have refused to give his assent if the C

opinion ? The point is that you never kn
matters whether a legal question will get
willingness to hear a case despite the politic
treated simply as bowing in the face of a
but a deliberate policy decision that the

charged atmosphere are not worth worrying
It is much too early to be certain tňat an
of politically heated issues is firmly establish

opinions do not seem to have partaken of

issue of delegation of powers in the Delhi Law
text which could not cause too much excitem

of legislation to small areas without their

though it might have been otherwise if the

welfare legislation. 65 What interest was
been the result of its being one of the first major decisions
by the Supreme Court. Of the Federal Court opinions only the
Central Provinces case generated much excitement.66 World War II and
the struggle for independence made the other three cases, decided in
1941, 1943 and 1944, only of secondary public importance.

The use of advisory opinions since the commencement of the

1950 Constitution has been confined to questions of public import in

accordance with the specific requirements of Article 143. But we
must not suppose that " public import" is synonymous with " political
volatility." The Delhi Laws Act case amply demonstrates that.
The responsibility at present for avoiding a reference involving
heated political controversy must rest largely with the government
seeking advice. Considering the broad discretion given to the Court
65. The United States attempt to settle the " delegation " problem involved
New Deal Welfare legislation ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 79 L. Ed. 446 (1934) 293
U.S. 388.

66. Hindustan Times, June 1, 1938, p 7, col. 2, indicates that the case was of
great public import, though much of the interest probably arose from its being the

first case before the new Federal Court.
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in an advisory opinion, there is no reason why it could not con
such factors relevant in deciding whether or not to answer th
tions posed ; but they do not presently appear to do so. In the

case the Court did not evęn note the State of Kerala's objec
the reference based on the charge of unfair political tactics
center. Certainly a volatile political background should lea

Court to note more carefully whatever factual prematurity may
such as the flux in the political situation in Berubari and the l
rules in the Kerala case.67

IV. Arguments in Support of Advisory Opinions
A. Acceleration of Judicial Review

A more careful examination is necessary of the specific argument
made in favour of advisory opinions as they apply to the Indian conte
It is frequently said that an advisory opinion save time. The fact whi
leads to this conclusion is the earlier point in time at which a case m
reach the Supreme Court when an advisory opinion is obtained. But

order for an advisory opinion to save time, it must convincingly settle th

dispute behind the reference. If it does not, more law suits will dev

lop and the advisory opinion will have only added to the judici
workload. This may occur either because the specific dispute is n

adequately laid to rest or, even if the dispute is settled, because the
general proposition of law applied in the case raises future uncertai
ties. If the lack of concreteness which comes with premature suits
an abstract treatment of a concrete case occurs in a reference to th
Court, the saving of time may, therefore, be an illusory hope. Indeed
it may be seriously questioned whether the Delhi Laws Act case or th
Hindu Womerfs reference lessened the litigation on the subject matt
in dispute.68

Furthermore, the opinion may not generate just the same numbe

of private litigations which would have occurred in the absence of a
reference. It may create doubts and uncertainties which would n

have arisen or would have otherwise been settled in a non-judic

manner. Lastly, the educational value of private litigation in differ

ent lower courts prior to a Supreme Court judgment should n
be underestimated. The various legal positions may be elaboratel

67. See text accompanying footnotes 46-48 concerning the Berubari case an
fn. 25 regarding the Kerala case.

68. See fn. 36 concerning the Delhi Laws Act case (general proposition of la

uncertain) ; and fn. 20 wherein is noted the Umayal Achi case, re-examining the Hin
Women's case (specific dispute not settled).
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explained and developed before the Supreme C

thereby ultimately leading to a more cons

highest court in the country.
There is another aspect of saving time besid

time spent in litigation or " judicial time.
comes much of the time and energy expend
sumption contrary to the law as now revealed
opinion by the most authoritative court in th
wastage. Once again, it must be remembered
only if the stare decisis effect of the opinion
mature dispute having been referred.

The problem of saving non-judicial time

the expenditure of time and energy by the go

involves the private sector. When the gov
especially under modern economic condition
ministration may come in its wake. If the law
this may all be for naught .N It has been sug
Provinces case afforded a good example of an
this salutary effect because of the adminis
would have followed this new taxing statut
case may also present this situation, for the a

new territory may involve the creation of new

But the assertion of wastage of time and
case, like all arguments for and against adv
examined in the light of the facts of the
this advantage of a reference does not justify
becomes law. Nor does it justify by-passin

rules. Care should be taken that there is a real likelihood of admini-

strative machinery being created in the future. The possible saving of
time may be a reason for the existence of the institution of advisory
opinions but it cannot justify its use in every case. It may even be
possible that a law can be implemented by the use of present adminis-

trative facilities. No new printed forms may be necessary. Tax

statutes will probably require new machinery if new taxes are imposed,
but not if they simply add to the list of assessees.

Governmental action may proceed beyond the stage of setting up

administration to the stage of altering the status quo, e.g,. the

69. "Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes 69 Harv . L. RevĒ
1302, 1313 (1956).
70. " Executive Consultation of the Judiciary with Special Reference in India "
Trivandrum Law College Journal, March 1955, Vol. I, p. 17. 22.
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actual collection of taxes. Here both governmental and pr

time and energy may have to be expended to restore the statu
Once again, the imminence of this possibility is a fact to be sho

an adversary debate in the reference itself. Not all govern
action alters the status quo. It may even require a mainten
the present situation.71

There may be a case where the government so alters the st

quo that the unscrambling is practically or totally impossi

the Berubari case there was fear that the cession of land to Pakistan

would create an unalterable situation once accomplished. However,
this is no argument for doing away with the imminence of that alteration which, in this case, meant a firm judgment by the executive to
by -pass the consultation of the Parliament and to instruct West Bengal
to implement the executive decision.

Injury to the private sector alone may be caused by private
parties, reliance on some assumption concerning the law. The Hindu
Women's case presents this problem, for the law in that case purported
to change property rights. Title and interest in reality would depend
on the validity of the statute involved.
All of the above points have been considered under the heading of
"saving of time", although several different problems have been mentioned. In reality the different problems of false reliances, wastage of
administrative machinery, and creation of unnecessary litigation are

all based upon a need for legal decision at an earlier point in time
than could otherwise be expected. The rationale is the desire not to
waste human energy. Framing the problem in this light may give us
a better insight into the significance of advisory opinions in India. It
is not just the envelopment of the individual by governmental machinery in the 20th century that urges the speedy resolution of legal
doubts. It is the importance of time itself. The government cannot
afford to allow time and money to be spent unscrambling events when
the country is in urgent need of pushing events ahead as rapidly as

possible. If a careful appraisal of the genuine risks be made before
deciding to accept a reference, an advisory opinion may contribute
to the conservation of the country's resources.
B. Creation of Judicial Review

There is another argument which urges the value of advisory
opinions completely apart from the conservation of time and energy.
*71. Kerala case, p. 968 ; clause 12 of the impugned statute fixed the teachers in
their positions by securing tenure, although other sections altered the status quo.
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This view supports the institution because it may
where none would otherwise be possible at any ti
a question of accelarating judicial scrutiny, but th
all. This argument assumes that there are cases w
rights are infringed but for which there is no relief

cess of adjudication. The special utility of advisor
to create a remedy for a violation of legal rights
wise go without redress.
We must first ascertain when legal rights exis
denied. It is not necessary to open up the whole a
tial controversary which surrounds the " no lega
but no legal remedy " debate. When we say that
without a remedy we mean only that the reasonab
would consider some action illegal or unconstitut

judicial relief. This concept of illegality or unc

important because the present argument in favour
is based upon the need to vindicate claims of illeg
mally heard in court.
In at least six situations the Constitution has c
for which there is no remedy :

(1) Articles 131 (Proviso) & 363 - legal dispute
treaties with the old Part B princely states o

so provide shall not be within the juris
court ;

(2) Article 31 (2) - no law shall be called into
court on the grounds that it provides inad
sation ;

(3) Article 359 (1) - in the case of a Presidential proclamation
of emergency an order may be made that the right to move
any court for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights may
be suspended ;
(4) Article 329 - a law relating to the delimitation of constituencies and the allotment of seats thereto shall not be
called into question in any court ;

(5) Articles 109 (3) & 199 (3) - the decision of the Speaker of
the House of the People or the State Legislative Assembly
is final on the issue of whether or not a bill is a Money Bill
and, therefore, to originate only in the House or Assembly;
(6) Article 361 - the President, Governor or Rajpramukh is not
answerable in any court for action purporting to be in the
exercise of his official duties.
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The emphasis in all six examples is on the creation of
bar to the effective enforcement of a legitimate legal c
131 or 363 does not gainsay the existence of a legal right
a treaty but simply removes such questions from the co

tion; Article 362 specifically guarantees due regard f

arising out of the agreements with the old princely sta
that other treaties come within the courts' purview dem
such issues are not beyond the general competence of th
Adequate compensation remains a constitutional requi

the first sentence of Article 31 (2) as interpreted by State of
v. Bela Banerjee ,73 although the last sentence removes the r

court on this issue. Article 359 suspends the right to
but does not suggest that the statute or other governm

which cannot be challenged does not violate the Cons

delimitation of constituencies may clearly involve a vio

Constitution if equal population, as nearly as is prac

achieved in accordance with the requirement of Article
similarly, a Money Bill cannot constitutionally be intro
upper house,74 even if a non-judicial statement is final o

and the action of a Chief Executive can certainly ex

tional or legal limits even if a court cannot review the t

These cases may be compared with other situation

Constitution where the courts have been divested of the
claims, but where the purpose appears to have been the
substantive basis for a claim. The emphasis in all these
on the creation of legislative competence to deal with c
rather than on the ouster of the courts from examinin

legal right. The following are examples where legislativ
has been created, i.e. legal rights extinguished :

(1) Article 19 (2-6) (excluding 19 (6) (i & ii) - reas

trictions for the benefit of the public interest, m

order shall not be affected by the freedoms
Article 19 (1) ;

(2) Article 19 (6) (i & ii) - statutes for professional
qualifications and for state monopolies shall not b
by the freedoms listed in Article 19 (1) ;

72. Article 131 of the Constitution of India gives original juris

Supreme Court in disputes between governments over treaties to the
specific types of treaties.

73. A.I.K. 1954 S.C. 170, 172.

74. Articles 109(1) and 198(1) of the Constitution of India.
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(3) Artide 305 - statutes validated b

shall not be affected by Article 301,
of trade ;

(4) Article 15 (4) - statutes for backw
Castes and Tribes shall not be affect
Article 29 (2), dealing with discrim
caste, race, sex or place of birth ;
(5) Article 31 A - statutes dealing wit
programs shall not be deemed void
19 & 31 ;

(6) Article 122 - no law shall be call
of any irregularity of procedure in

In all of these examples except number
a judgment that certain types of legislat

and are, therefore, not to be illegal. It

some of the Amendments to the Constitu

examples 2-5, represented an attempt

intention of the Constitution.75

Example six, dealing with parliamentary procedures, stands on a
different footing and illustrates some of the difficulty with our analysis.

It would have been easy to say that those examples which spoke in
terms of a loss of procedural remedy were all cases of legal rights lacking a legal remedy. Indeed, it is still a good guide to that conclusion
and all the examples we have given of a legal right without a remedy

do speak in terms of a procedural bar i.e., "suspension of the right
to move the court", "loss of jurisdiction", and "not call into question
in any court". However, the example involving legislative procedures,
which we placed in the "no right" section, also speaks of "not calling
into question in any court". Thus, while verbal expression is a good
guide, underlying policy must also be looked to. It appears that legislative rules are meant only for the convenience of the legislature, much
as a club may set its own regulations. A violation of such rules does
not involve an illegal act from the point of view of society, any more

than a tennis club violates a legal right when it refuses membership
without a quorum.
One of the examples of a loss of a procedural remedy may actually involve a loss of a legal right. Article 31 (2) prevents adequacy of
compensation from being examined by a court. Because this provision
came in with the Amendments to the Constitution which sought to
75. R. Sharma, The Supreme Court in the Indian Constitution (1959) p. 271.
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sustain broad state programs of social welfare,76 it may be th
tive competence was created rather than a mere removal of

However, unlike Article 31 A, it did not speak of a law
deemed void, an expression which connotes the creation of

competence. Rather, it spoke of "not calling into questio
court" the adequacy of compensation, leaving untouched
which judicial gloss had read as requiring such remuner
Furthermore, there is a basis for distinguishing the tre

Article 31 A from 31 (2). Adequacy of compensation is still
a cornerstone of a democratic constitution. Article 31 A
far as to make constitutional certain state programs which
listic. But to legitimize inadequate compensation would be

beyond socialism. Hence, inadequacy of compensation rem

constitutional, however inadequate the remedy may be.
It is obvious that one may argue with the categorization

ous Articles of the Constitution in the above analysis.

important for our purposes is the acceptance of the need to
categories if we are to understand the argument which supp

sory opinions because they provide judicial review for
neglected legal rights. It is clear that there may be legal

arising out of those examples which involve a total extincti
rights. For example, one may want to know if a preventive
Act violates Article 19 (1) (d), even if reasonable restriction
freedom are constitutionally imposed; or if a statute for
classes violates Article 15 (1) even though Article 15 (4) valid
Similarly, the violation of parliamentary procedures may rai
cal legal question even though there are no legal rights vest
proper observance of the rules. However, such a use of advi

nions could not be based upon the argument that the co

function of the Supreme Court provides a forum for the pr
legal rights which would not receive attention anywhere else
In fact, the use of advisory opinions for legal questions n

ving legal rights might not even be justified by the Indian

tion. The resolution of this issue depends upon the defin
"question of law" in Article 143, which creates the autho

reference proceeding.

76. Basu , Shorter Constitution of India (2d. Ed. 1959) p. 131 (quoting Se
mittee recommendation that the quantum of compensation be for the leg

the courts). This certainly sounds more like the creation of legislative
than a procedural bar.
77. See fn. 73.
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Article 131 of the Constitution sets the
Court's original jurisdiction as a question (w

which the existence of a legal right depe

speaks only of a question of law without me
article deals with appeals from High Court
cessity, involve legal rights. Thus the patte
using the phrase "question of law" seems co
in which a legal question arises in the conte
Nor can the inclusion of " questions of fac
the range of matters which may be referred

questions not relating to legal rights. Th
which there can be inquiry must be a fac

which arise within the scope of a " question
word " fact " will have a wayward meaning
thing and everything.
Were the use of advisory opinions allowed
arising in the context of a legal right, we w
the dangers of premature intrusion into sen

Thus to ask if a Preventive Detention Act

although there is no question of unreasonab
question of the violation of a legal right, is

with a crucial issue.78 Likewise, the norm

advisor may be displaced as when the parlia
Lok Sabha rules is disregarded in favour of

urges an interpretation of "question of l
includes only legal questions relating to le
broader interpretation be given in the inter

discretion, that discretion should normally b
mature involvement in questions of law not
rights.

Before we proceed to examine the merits of the argument favouring the use of advisory opinions to create a judicial remedy for legal
rights not otherwise protected, we must make sure that the Constitu-

tion allows such a practice. The language of the Constitution might
be considered ambiguous. The procedural bars to judicial review in
the Articles we have noted might exclude even the Supreme Court in
its advisory capacity. Thus " no jurisdiction " might include a reference proceeding and an advisory opinion might be considered to " call

78. Of course, this legal question did come up in a case where unreasonableness
was also asserted and, therefore, a legal right allegedly violated ; A. K. Gopalan v*
1950 S.G. 27.
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into question " that which was forbidden to be judic
ever, the Constitution nowhere speaks of the adviso
of the Supreme Court ; it is more properly referred
tive function to which a term like "jurisdiction " do
Indeed, in the very case where jurisdiction is denied
the Constitution requires an advisory opinion from
143(2) ) if the President so requests. Nor can an advi
considered to "call anything into question " in any co
advice of the Court is sought.
A similar analysis is applicable to the other Artic

cedural bar is imposed. The finality of a Speaker

impaired by seeking advice which does not technical
the finality of that judgment. And the right to mo
writ petition which is suspended by Article 359(1) c
suits brought in the normal course of litigation ; fo
consultation does not move the Court to apply any re
It is not suggested that the procedures and practic
jurisdiction are not to be closely approximated in a
of the dangers of advisory opinions spring from fail

rules of prematurity applicable in a normal suit.

historical distinction between advisory opinions and
as an aid to interpreting the meaning of the section

judicial hearing. That historical distinction may

interpret an instrument which is the product of hi
advisory opinions where another type of judicial he
the same time we reject that distinction as a good gu
ing the practice which the Court should follow in a r
Whatever ambiguity may remain in this matter sh
in favour of allowing advisory opinions where there

to normal litigation. This is more consistent with

discretionary approach of Indian courts in all matte
relief for infringed legal rights. Each case can th
scrutinized to see if an advisory opinion should be gi
It remains vital in deciding how this discretion sh
to discover why the jurisdiction was withheld in the
proceeding. For the reasons for such a withdrawal of
magically slip away because the case arises in a refer

79. It is so described in Basu, Shorter Constitution of India (3r
and in the title of an article in Trivandrum Law College Journal
p. 17 (Consultation of the Judiciary with Special Reference to
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may be shed on this question by examining the
cretion is left to the Court to refuse an opinion

all other judicial relief is denied. The fact tha

cretion does not make such an inquiry irrelevan
in referring the question, should still be guided
normally preclude judicial review. The reason w
holds normal jurisdiction where treaties with t
princely states 80 are concerned is their enormo
and background.81 The integration of these anc

volved every method of persuasion available.

greater political heat than the absorption of one
However, even with these treaties there may ar
genuinely legal and in which the legal issues ar
tially political struggle. Hence the exception in
ing for an advisory opinion. The other forbidd
in Article 131 involves treaties which provide t
reviewed in the courts. It may be presumed that
also based on a predominance of the political ba
treaty originated. The exception in Article 143(
disputes which do not partake of this atmospher

The other areas where courts are deprived

where legal rights persist may be analyzed in t
compensation given after the government's exer
powers is not justiciable under Article 31(2). Th
amendment to the Constitution suggests that the
government resented interference by the judic

of social reform.83 As long as the center and

same party, a reference by the center is unlikel

political controversy. However, if the state's

referred to the Court by a politically hostile cen

80. Explicit reference to these old princely states i

removed in 1956 since the abolition of the separate cate

Treaties with such states are still covered bv Article 131 i Pr

81. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Ind

493 and passim .

82. The opinion is made compulsory in thé case of the
interest of giving them some tangible assurance that the
judicial relief. The compulsion with regard to other trea

them from normal adjudication is probably an acciden
tioned in the same paragraph which withholds jurisdictio

old princely states are concerned (Article 131, Proviso).

83. See fn. 76.
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original withdrawal of jurisdiction are as applicable as w
private litigaņt challenged social reform legislation.
Similarly, in the case of a suspension of a remedy for
Rights under Article 359, the policy must be that the e
volatile for a court to interfere due to the emergency

suspension. However, there may be cases where the p

vidual's Fundamental Right is affected in connection wit
governmental activity unrelated to the emergency altho

dent's suspension order forbids all petitions. Such a

perly be referred to the Court though care would have
•assure that there is no appearance of discrimination in f
who stand to benefit by the advisory opinion.
The courts are not allowed to examine the delimitation of consti-

tuencies and the allotment of seats thereto.^ Once again, it is likely
that the drafters of the Constitution did not want the political passions
aroused by the issues of representation to be vented in the courts.
In the case of Money Bills, the policy is not based on the volatile

nature of the dispute. It is the desire to get a quick decision which
will be free from interference where any other rule would delay the
process of legislation. And the protection of the Chief Executive is

based upon an obvious need to preserve his dignity and prevent

harassment.

The discretion to give an advisory opinion and the decision to ask
for one must be made in the light of these reasons for withholding
judicial scrutiny in the usual case ; the absence of the factor normally
precluding review must be the test. Usually this will mean the absence

of a politically volatile background. But where political heat is not
the main reason for precluding judicial review, as with the final deci-

sion of the Speaker on Money Bills and the immunity of the Chief
Executive, the other considerations outlined above must prevail. If
this principle is not observed, an advisory opinion will hurl the Court
into the very difficulties which the Constitution sought to avoid when
the right to a hearing was taken away. If soundly used, however, an
advisory opinion may dispel charges of unfairness in those situations

where the government is most vulnerable i.e., where the alleged unfairness is in an area where judicial reYiew is also precluded.
V. CONCLUSION

The basic justifications for the settlement of cases of doub

maturity, discussed in a prior article, are also persuasive argument
favour of the institution of advisory opinions. They are two :* (1)
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vital importance of avoiding the wastage of
paralysis born of legal uncertainties and to t
es based on incorrect legal views ; (2) the in
or political solution of disputes which may b
There is strong evidence in Article 143 it

tions were part of the rationale for the existen

system in India. The provision of Article

are " likely to arise " may be referred may i
depart frofn the stricter norms of maturity

in the interests of preventing wastage of

requirement that a question be of public im
political heat may be tolerable in the interes
of an otherwise unmanageable dispute. Both
demonstrate that advisory opinions are not
cribed in scope as the normal declaratory jud
Furthermore, the use of advisory opinions
drawn from normal judicial examination be
may inevitably involve some commitment by
ment of politically charged disputes. While,
rights arising in a non-political atmosphere w
ests of averting a charge of unfairness agai
outweigh whatever risks exist.

Thus, our criticism of the Berubari case m

Whatever doubts there may have been ab
firmness of the government's decision m

irreparability of the harm to the residents
the importance to the country of soothing
West Bengal, and the need to assure the cou
intention to act legally. The importance o
the degree of harm to the refugees in the d
have found themselves back in Pakistan; and
solution due to the widespread dissatif actio
never known for political calm.
It remains true, however, that each justif
opinion carries its own danger. Anticipation
in vagueness and the creation of more doub
causing a greater wastage of time and energ
inadequacy of a non- judicial solution, the c
capacity to prevent nascent disputes from e
volatileness which the court hopes to dispel
jection for certain legal rights involving hea
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judicial cognizance is evidence that the Indian Parliament
view in certain cases. Nor will the pressures arising from
with the Court's conclusions be so easily released when
ment does not command a majority capable of amendi
titution.

In the Indian context one over-riding factor makes th
less serious and the utility of an advisory opinion'greater
immense prestige which the opinions of the higher cour
predominating willingness to obey the courts' judgments

greater risks may be taken with the goodwill which

possesses. More especially, the Court's role as advisors fit
with «a traditionally non-litigious society accustomed to
opinion of elders rather than to allow a controversy to gro
out of hand.

It is certainly too early to reach any definite conclusion about the
functioning of this institution. The Allocation case seemed a harmless
example of its use ; but, because it brought to the Court a case which
could have been there under the original jurisdiction,84 none of the
advantages are illustrated. If this case had allowed the government
to by-pass lower courts and get a judgment more quickly, time would
have been saved. Or if it had allowed a declaratory judgment, which
would not otherwise have been available, a form of judicial scrutiny
would have been created which might have advantages over actions for
coercive relief being sought by the government or being awaited from

the injured party. However, under the Government of India Act,

1935, the Federal Court could give only declaratory judgments.85
The problem of abstractness in the extreme form of the Levy case
does not seem a serious threat at present.86 Since that case, the lack
of factual development has been the failure to allow history to provide
those facts which shed light on the proper legal rule, rather than a
failure to have sufficient facts for an adequate adversary proceeding or
an understanding of the immediate impact of the relevant legal rule.87
84. Government of India Act, 1935, sec. 204(l)(a)(i).
85. Government of India Act, 1935, sec. 204(2).
86. Hindustan Times, April 26, 1944, p. 3, col. 1 (observations by the judges
should assure greater consideration by the government in the future on the issue of
prematurity) ; in fact, no instance of the reference of a question not yet in the stages

òf a draft bill has recurred.

87. Delhi Laws Act and Kerala cases -, see paragraphs accompanying footnotes
26-31 wherein we have labelled this distinction as one between legislative or historical
and adjudicative facts.
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The danger recently has been the volatile
enced by the Kerala and Berubari cases. These
on the rationale that they were creating a ju
not otherwise have been forthcoming. Juri
matter was not forbidden the courts nor could it be said that the

litigants involved were legally inarticulate or unconscious of their legal

rights.88 These cases are examples of the acceleration of judicial

review,89 in which the Kerala reference exhibited the dual danger of

involvement in political controversy and an appearance of political

discrimination in the use of an advisory opinion.
Our criticism of the various advisory opinions must not, however,
be taken as a disapproval of the decision to request or give an opinion

We have rather tried to bring out the shortcomings as well as the
advantages of this institution by examples drawn from the Indian

experience. In reserve, the institution may serve useful purposes. But
the justifications for its use must be carefully examined and weighed
in the context of each case to see if they are really applicable. It rests
with both the government as questioner and the Court in its capacity
as guardian of the efficient working of the judicial system to see that
its use does not become more of a danger to the long-term interests of
justice than a benefit If the stricture that the institution is good if
used infrequently is true, there must be some reasons for that being
so. It is hoped that the analysis in both this article and a prior one
on prematurity may serve to aid in furthering an examination of those
reasons.

88. In the Berubari reference, an attempt had already been m
ment in the Calcutta High Court ; Nirmal Bose v. Union of MV
And in the Kerala case, the Anglo-Indian, Christian and Muslim

be considered politically or legally unawares.
89. In the Kerala case, the bill had not yet become law and so
able by private parties at this early stage.

In the Berubari case, the Calcutta High Court had express

maturity of the case (see paragraphs accompanying footnotes 4
the time necessary for perfecting an appeal to the Supreme Co
reference (the Calcutta case was reported on April 8, 1959; the
on April 7, 1959; and an opinion given less than a year later,
And lastly, the time needed to bring a new case in the jurisdictio
Government of India would be subject to the Court's writ was dis
Bose v. Union of India A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 506 had held that the
did not have the power to issue a writ against the center in this
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THE NEED FOR RESEARCH IN LAW

Whether law be looked upon as a pure imperative, derivin

authority from the command of some superior, or whether it be v

as a form of "social engineering" that plays a creative role i
building of a good society, it is concerned first and foremost
human behaviour and human relations in a given social conte
Many new sciences are now studying this behaviour and these

tions, and in the light of their findings old legal rules and proce

need re-examination. As society changes, so its law must cha

either in response to the underlying movement or in an attempt t

vent or canalize the movement. Some parts of the law, partic

private law, may endure for centuries with little alteration ; even
there is à constant need to rationalize the law, to make it more ce
and more easily discoverable. Beyond this the fields are increasi
which amendments and reforms are required. The judge, lawyer
teacher must not only understand and apply the existing law, wit
daily increment of new statutes, administrative regulations and
decisions, but as members of an organized profession they must
part in the law-making process by promoting neeeded legal chang
giving to legislatures from time to time their informed and exp
opinion

The
l
be
rec
embraces the whole of society. The lawyer has always claimed to
belong to a learned profession. While the life of the law is, as Holmes
said, not logic but experience, it is learning or scholarship, that records
that experience, draws lessons from it, and makes them available to the
practitioner. Without learning there cannot exist those qualities of
mind which make the great jurists and the leading counsel. Research,

and learning or scholarship, are inseparable concepts, perhaps not
capable of differentiation; research involves fact-finding, fact ordering
and correlating, but does not exclude the thanking about the facts and
the observation of trends which are more exclusively the role of the
scholar. The multiplicity of facts in contemporary society, including
the startling fact, basic to the practising lawyer, that reported cases
and statutes are increasing at an unconscionable rate each year, makes
fact-gathering research and legal writing more than even essential to
orderly progress in the law, and to the validity of the scholarship which
largely depends on the accuracy of this research. So among lawyers
we should find the keenest interest in research.

- ' Report of the Committee on Legal Research ' 34 Curi. Bar
Rev. 999, 1002-'3.
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